New and Noteworthy--The Army of Tennessee's Failure To Win

Conquered: Why The Army of Tennessee Failed, Larry J. Daniel, University of North Carolina Press, 440pp., 5 maps, 7 tables, 7 illustrations, bibliographic notes, bibliography, index, $35.00

Why did the Confederate Army of Tennessee consistently suffer military defeats? The Army of Northern Virginia won most of their battles until 1864. Was it just a matter of a different caliber of generals?  Some notable historians answer the question with an affirmation and that personalities made the difference and that there were Virginians and then there was everybody else.

Larry J. Daniel states that generalship of one of several factors and the other factors included sectionalism inside the Army of Tennessee's ranks, geography and rivers defied tactical solutions. Regional politics which included reluctant Kentuckians and eastern Tennesseans were also a cause of dissent among officers and enlisted men. An ill-trained officer corps lacked both skills and a depth of talent. Its cavalry corps was handicapped by a lack of disciplined leadership and a preponderance of strategic mis-directions, and tactical mis-fortunes. If the Army of Northern Virginia is a exhibit of the vitality of the Confederacy then the Army of Tennessee is an exhibit of the fragility of the Confederacy.  And yet the Army of Tennessee stayed on the field.

Stanley Horn's 1941 The Army of Tennessee and Thomas Connelly's 1971 two volumes, The Army of the Heartland and The Autumn of Glory, Richard McMurray's Two Great Rebel Armies each present political, logistical, and geographic factors combining with dysfunctional personalities and naive, independent spirits. Daniel's work is much like Joseph Glatthaar's and George Rable's works which combines war, society, and the natural environment to evaluate Confederate military commanders and their troops. Daniel views the Army of Tennessee of 1861 and 1862 as having flawed foundations resting on sectionalism and professional incompetence. Redeeming characteristics include the brotherhood of Tennesseans and the sway of evangelical Christianity in general over the troops of several states. Also, Daniel's review of arms and ammunition supplies, food and horses availability was sufficient in general but the ability to transport these to an army on campaign or in winter quarters was sadly lacking.

Daniel offering of diaries, letters to home and letters to newspapers is notable and convincing of the larger points which he makes. His coverage of the Army of Tennessee's campaigns and battles is insightful and at times, even suspenseful. Conquered: Why The Army of Tennessee Failed is a cogent and clearly written exposition of the victories and defeats, the tribulations and trials, and perseverance of volunteer soldiers pressed on all sides but enduring through the last days.

From the Publisher:  Operating in the vast and varied trans-Appalachian west, the Army of Tennessee was crucially important to the military fate of the Confederacy. But under the principal leadership of generals such as Braxton Bragg, Joseph E. Johnston, and John Bell Hood, it won few major battles, and many regard its inability to halt steady Union advances into the Confederate heartland as a matter of failed leadership. Here, esteemed military historian Larry J. Daniel offers a far richer interpretation. Surpassing previous work that has focused on questions of command structure and the force's fate on the fields of battle, Daniel provides the clearest view to date of the army's inner workings, from top-level command and unit cohesion to the varied experiences of common soldiers and their connections to the home front. Drawing from his mastery of the relevant sources, Daniel's book is a thought-provoking reassessment of an army's fate, with important implications for Civil War history and military history writ large.

Forthcoming--- 1864 In Eastern Tennessee: Cleburne's Diary, USCT at Nashville, Preservation Efforts at Nashville and Franklin

The Tennessee Campaign of 1864, edited by Steven E. Woodworth and Charles D. Grear, 296 pp., 14 illustrations, $34.50. January  or February 2016. 

From The Publisher: Few American Civil War operations matched the controversy, intensity, and bloodshed of Confederate general John Bell Hood’s ill-fated 1864 campaign against Union forces in Tennessee. In the first-ever anthology on the subject, The Tennessee Campaign of 1864, edited by Steven E. Woodworth and Charles D. Grear, fourteen prominent historians and emerging scholars examine the three-month operation, covering the battles of Allatoona, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as well as the decimation of Hood’s army at Nashville.

The volume’s contributors explore the campaign’s battlefield action, including how Major General Andrew J. Smith’s three aggressive divisions of the Army of Tennessee became the most successful Federal unit at Nashville, how vastly outnumbered Union troops held the Allatoona Pass, why Hood failed at Spring Hill and how the event has been perceived, and why so many of the Army of Tennessee’s officer corps died at the Battle of Franklin, where the Confederacy suffered a disastrous blow.

An exciting inclusion is the diary of Confederate major general Patrick R. Cleburne, which covers the first phase of the campaign. Essays on the strained relationship between Ulysses S. Grant and George H. Thomas and on Thomas’s approach to warfare reveal much about the personalities involved, and chapters about civilians in the campaign’s path and those miles away show how the war affected people not involved in the fighting.

An innovative case study of the fighting at Franklin investigates the emotional and psychological impact of killing on the battlefield, and other implications of the campaign include how the courageous actions of the U.S. Colored Troops at Nashville made a lasting impact on the African American community and how preservation efforts met with differing results at Franklin and Nashville.

Canvassing both military and social history, this well-researched volume offers new, illuminating perspectives while furthering long-running debates on more familiar topics. These in-depth essays provide an insider’s view of one of the most brutal and notorious campaigns in Civil War history.

Editors andContributors: 

 

Steven E. Woodworth is a professor of history at Texas Christian University. He is the author or editor of thirty-one books about the Civil War, including This Great Struggle: America’s Civil War; Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861–1865; and Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West. He is a coeditor of the Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland series.

Charles D. Grear is a professor of history and the online manager for history and geography at Central Texas College. A specialist on Texas and the Civil War, he is the author, coauthor, or editor of six books, including The Chattanooga Campaign, Why Texans Fought in the Civil War, and The House Divided: America in the Era of the Civil War. He is a coeditor of the Civil War Campaigns in the Heartland series.

Contributors include Stewart Bennett, Andrew S. Bledsoe, John J. Gaines, John R. Lundberg, Jennifer M. Murray, Paul L. Schmelzer, Brooks D. Simpson, Timothy B. Smith, Scott L. Stabler, Jonathan M. Steplyk, D. L. Turner, and William Lee White.